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Lessons Learned from the Manhattan Voyage |
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What had clearly been learned in the 1969 voyage were several basic Arctic icebreaking truths:
- A large mass moving at decent speed (our “model”) could break very tough multi-year ice and ridges, but it would need real backing power to prevent getting stuck, an absolute “must” if un-escorted tankers were to succeed.
- Maneuverability in ice is very difficult for a “parallel body” merchant ship shape even with bow bulges.
- Geared steam turbine machinery with new propellers and shafts could withstand the severe shocks that broken ice floes going through the propellers often caused.
- In near “open” water conditions, growlers and bergy bits were able to cause major structural damage in nonreinforced parts of the ship’s hull.
- Success of icebreaking tankers would be very much in the hands of a ship’s crew, even with reconnaissance by aircraft and side-looking radar, to find preferable routes though the ice. Most important was the conclusion supported by all who participated in the Manhattan voyage was that it is technically and economically feasible to use non-escorted large icebreaking merchant ships for the routes explored, and most likely also for the Northern Sea Route.
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The Great Northern Expedition |
In Russian history, the Great Northern Expedition refers to a wide enterprise initially conceived by tsar Peter I the Great. The tsar had a vision for the 18th century Russian navy to map the Northern Sea Route to the East. This vast and far-reaching endeavor was sponsored by the Admiralty College in St. Petersburg. In 1725, Russian explorers under the leadership of Captain Vitus Bering, a Dane serving in the Russian navy, made the first expedition voyage on Sviatoy Gavriil starting in Kamchatka and going north to the strait that now bears his name.
The major sailing of the Great Northern Expedition was undertaken between 1733 and 1743 through a series of voyages led by Aleksei Chirikov. The goal of the expedition was to find and map the eastern reaches of Siberia, and to hopefully continue on to the western shores of North America to map them as well.
The important achievements of the expedition included the discovery of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Commander Islands and Bering Island; as well as a detailed cartographic assessment of the northern and northeastern coast of Russia and the Kuril Islands. The expedition also refuted definitively the legend of a land mass in the north Pacific. It also included ethnographic, historic and scientific research into Siberia and Kamchatka. When the expedition failed to round the northeast tip of Asia, the dream of finding an economically viable Northeast Passage, alive since the 16th century, was at an end.
With more than 3,000 people directly and indirectly involved, the Second Kamchatka expedition was one of the largest expedition projects in history. The total cost of the undertaking, completely financed by the Russian state, reached the estimated sum of 1.5 million rubles, an enormous amount for the period. This corresponded to one-sixth of the income of the Russian state for the year 1724. Because of its complexity and scale, the voyages became known as the Great Northern Expedition.
Despite the extreme hardships and numerous deaths, mainly from scurvy, the Great Northern Expedition represented a remarkable accomplishment in terms of organization, perseverance and courage. More so, it resulted in an outstanding compilation of knowledge. In tangible terms, the expedition resulted in 62 maps and charts of the Arctic coast and Kamchatka. It is interesting to contrast the general chart of the Russian Arctic resulting from the Great Northern Expedition with what was known of the Arctic coast of North America at the same date (by then William Baffin’s voyage round Baffin Bay had largely been forgotten or discredited and the only part of the Arctic coast reliably known and charted was that of the Hudson Bay and Strait)
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Icebreaker Navigation in the Central Arctic Ocean, 1977-2008 |
 One of the historic polar achievements at the end of the 20th century and early in the 21st century has been the successful operation of icebreakers at the North Pole and across the central Arctic Ocean.
Between 1977 and 2008 access in summer has been attained by capable icebreaking ships to all regions of the Arctic basin. Seventy-seven voyages have been made to the Geographic North Pole by the icebreakers of Russia (65), Sweden (five), USA (three), Germany (two), Canada (one) and Norway (one).
Nineteen of the 77 voyages have been in support of scientific exploration and the remaining 58 have been for marine tourism, all but one of the tourism voyages conducted aboard nuclear icebreakers.
Of the 76 icebreaker voyages that have been to the pole in summer, the earliest date of arrival has been July 2, 2007 and the latest September 12, 2005, a short 10-week navigation season for highly capable icebreaking ships.
The Soviet nuclear icebreaker Arktika, during a celebrated voyage, was the first surface ship to attain the North Pole on August 17, 1977. Arktika departed from Murmansk on August 9 and sailed eastbound initially north of Novaya Zemlya and through Vilkitski Strait to the ice edge in the Laptev Sea. The ship sailed northward to the pole along longitude 125 degrees east and reached the pole on August 17. Arktika arrived back in Murmansk on August 23 having sailed 3,852 nautical miles in 14 days at a speed of 11.5 knots.
The only voyage to the pole not to be conducted in summer was that of the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sibir, which supported scientific operations during May 8 to June 19, 1987, reaching the North Pole on May 25. Sibir navigated in near-maximum thickness of Arctic sea ice while removing the personnel from Soviet North Pole Drift Station 27 and establishing a new scientific drift station (number 29) in the northern Laptev Sea. This successful voyage in the central Arctic Ocean could be considered the most demanding icebreaker operation to date.
No commercial ship has ever conducted a voyage across the central Arctic Ocean. However, seven trans-Arctic voyages, all in summer, have been accomplished by icebreakers in the central Arctic Ocean through the North Pole.
A voyage across the central Arctic Ocean with tourists was conducted by the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz in August 1991. The Arctic Ocean Section 1994 Expedition, conducted by Canada’s Louis S. St-Laurent and the Polar Sea of the United States, was the first scientific transect of the Arctic Ocean accomplished by surface ship. During July and August 1994 both ships sailed from the Bering Strait to the North Pole and to an exit between Greenland and Svalbard through Fram Strait. The expedition made extensive use of real-time satellite imagery (received aboard Polar Sea) for strategic navigation and scientific planning.
Two trans-Arctic voyages with tourists through the North Pole were accomplished by the Russian nuclear icebreaker Yamal in summer 1996. In summer 2005, Sweden’s icebreaker, the Oden, and the American icebreaker Healy also made trans-Arctic passages in a second and highly successful scientific expedition by surface ships across the central Arctic Ocean.
Although not a trans-Arctic voyage, the operation of a threeship scientific expedition for Arctic seabed drilling during late summer 2004, mentioned earlier, is noteworthy. Included in the AMSA 2004 database, the expedition was composed of Russia’s nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz and Sweden’s Oden, both used extensively for ice management, and the Norwegian-flag icebreaker Vidar Viking outfitted for drilling. One of the key accomplishments was the return of a 400-meter sediment core from the seabed that is being used for scientific studies of past Arctic climates.
A review of these historic polar voyages indicates that marine access in summer throughout the Arctic Ocean has been achieved by the 21st century by highly capable icebreakers. The nuclear icebreakers of the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation have clearly pioneered independent ship operations in the central Arctic Ocean, especially on voyages to the North Pole in summer. Conventionally powered icebreakers have also operated successfully on trans-Arctic voyages in summer, as well as on scientific expeditions to high-latitudes in all regions of the Arctic Ocean. Any planning for future navigation in the central Arctic Ocean would do well to understand the ship performance, environmental conditions and ice navigation capabilities of these successful operations in the ice-covered central Arctic Ocean.
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Arctic Marine Tourism: A New Challenge |
 As passenger and cruise vessel traffic continues to increase in the Arctic, infrastructure and passenger safety needs will become of increasing concern. The large number of tourists already cruising Arctic waters now exceeds the emergency response capabilities of local communities (See page 172). The Arctic’s cold air and water temperatures require the quick and efficient rescue of capsized vessels and tourists aboard lifeboats and rafts. Even limited exposure to cold weather and seas quickly reduces human endurance and chances of survival. These hazardous environmental conditions prevail in a region that has very scarce emergency response resources and where long distances result in lengthy response times. Emergency protocols become increasingly difficult as both small and large cruise ships seek remote wilderness settings and wildlife habitats. The primary polar attractions sought by tourists are rarely close to emergency response services. This combination of hostile environmental conditions and scarce emergency infrastructure is a serious threat to human life.
When performing search and rescue in the polar regions, there is an urgent need to respond quickly, as the prevention of injury and loss of life depends on timely response, prompt evacuation and the application of medical and other emergency response services. Effective responses can only be accomplished by the design and implementation of appropriate search and rescue management policies and programs, supported by appropriate physical infrastructure and well-trained personnel.
Ship evacuation produces a host of emergency response problems in the polar world. Passengers and crew must be sheltered from inclement weather, properly clothed, nourished and hydrated. The provision of these basic necessities in the polar environment, either sea or land, is formidable. The ability to successfully communicate a distress signal of any sort in the polar world can further exacerbate these threatening circumstances. Communications in the Arctic may be a challenge. However, ships equipped with adequate communication equipment (for example, digital selective calling-high frequency, or DSC-HF, and Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon, or EPRIB) are able to transmit distress messages.
It is not likely that communities located in the remote, high Arctic have sufficient medical resources to respond to illnesses involving hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of cruise ship passengers and crew. And given their histories, the indigenous people living in rural Arctic communities are understandably fearful of exposure to infectious diseases.
A dangerous consequence of the growing popularity and number of cruise ships operating in and transiting through polar waters is the significant increase of marine incidents. Serious marine incidents include sinkings, groundings, pollution and other environmental violations, disabling by collision, fire and loss of propulsion. Rapid increase in the number of cruise ship voyages has led to a similar increase in the number of incidents.
Given the large number of cruise ships and other recreational boaters currently operating throughout the polar seas and the probable growth of those markets, marine operators, Arctic governments and local communities are faced with significant management challenges.
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Year-round Arctic Marine Transport to Dudinka in Support of Natural Resource Development and Production |
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 Since the winter of 1978-79, one of the most advanced Arcticmarine transport systems in the Arctic has been the year-roundoperation comprised of rail traffic between the mines of the Miningand Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel to the port in Dudinka,on the Yenisei River and then the 231 nautical mile sailing toMurmansk, on the Kola Peninsula.
MMC Norilsk Nickel is the world’s largest producer of nickel andpalladium, and is among the top four platinum producers in theworld, as well as among the top 10 copper producers. MMC NorilskNickel is also a large global enterprise with production facilities inthe Russian Federation, Australia, Botswana, Finland, the UnitedStates and the Republic of South Africa.
Mining in the Norilsk area began in the 1920s. The region quicklybecame a critical supplier of non-ferrous metals within the SovietUnion. During the 1950s, the Northern Sea Route Administrationwas tasked with building a year-round Arctic marine transport systemon the western end of the NSR and into the Yenisei.
The development of large, nuclear icebreakers came first withthe Lenin in 1959 (world’s first nuclear surface ship) followed by asmall fleet of larger icebreakers of the Arktika class. These icebreakerswere designed to create tracks in the ice for lower-poweredcargo ships to sail in convoy astern of a lead icebreaker.
With unlimited endurance, the nuclear icebreakers could provideyear-round services in the deeper waters along the majorroutes of the NSR. Ice-strengthened cargo ships and shallow-drafticebreakers came next. By the 1978-79 winter season there wasenough icebreaking capacity to maintain year-round navigation byconvoying ships from the Yenisei west across the Kara Sea and intothe Barents Sea to Murmansk. A continuous flow of non-ferrousmetal concentrates could be maintained to smelters on the KolaPeninsula and to other industries in the Soviet Union.
During 1982-87 a new icebreaking cargo ship, the SA-15 orNorilsk class, was delivered by Finland’s former Valmet and Wartsilashipyards to the Soviet Union. Nineteen of these Arctic freighters(174 m length and 19,950 dwt) were built and several today remainin service on the route between Dudinka and Murmansk.
In many respects, the Norilsk class multi-purpose carriers revolutionizedArctic shipping in the same manner as the commercialcarrier M/V Arctic developed for the Canadian Arctic during thesame years. With high propulsion power (21,000 shp), the Norilskclass ships could operate under their own power as an icebreaker.These ships carried cargoes the length of the NSR in summerduring the late 1980s; during the winter they were used effectivelyto support the Norilsk-Dudinka operation.
Their proven capability for independent navigation through icefields without icebreaker support was a significant technologicalachievement, as well as a notable advance in efficient (and costeffective)Arctic marine operations. The successful operation ofthese ships was a harbinger of the future for Arctic marine transport.
In April 1988, a new, shallow-draft polar icebreaker namedTaymyr was delivered to the Soviet Union by Wartsila’s Helsinkishipyard. A single nuclear reactor was installed at the Baltic shipyardin (then) Leningrad, and the ship was ready for service alongthe NSR and in the shallow Siberian rivers by 1989. A secondship of the class, Yaygach, was added to the Murmansk ShippingCompany’s icebreaker fleet in 1990.
The design of this class represents the apex in the developmentprocess for the Soviet polar icebreaker fleet. Coupled in its designare Finnish advances in shallow-draft ship design with nuclear propulsiondeveloped in the Soviet Union. A draft of only 8 meters wasattained with Taymyr, which compares favorably with the average11-meters draft of the largest Soviet icebreakers of the period. Apower plant producing 44,000 shp provided a capability of continuouslybreaking 1.8 meters of level ice at a 2-knot speed. Thesecapabilities fit perfectly with the requirements for icebreaking (levelriver ice) on the shallow Yenisei River to the port of Dudinka; theseextraordinary nuclear ships could maintain an ice track out to theKara Sea through the winter in nearly all conditions.
Year-round shipping to Dudinka functioned throughout the1990s and the early years of the new century despite the financialchallenges facing the Russian Federation. MMC Norilsk Nickelwas restructured several times and since 2001 the company hasflourished, focusing on economic efficiencies, foreign marketingand potential investments. The marine transport component alsoreceived significant attention as the SA-15 Norilsk class ships supportingthe Dudinka run began to age.
The company’s marine operations department worked closelywith the Finnish shipbuilder Aker Yards to develop a new freighterclass that would be owned and operated by MMC Norilsk Nickel.The vision was for a fleet of five icebreaking containershipsdesigned for year-round operations. The first of the ships, NorilskNickel (168 meter length, 14,500 dwt, 650 TEU capacity), was completedin Helsinki early in 2006. The new ship is designed as a “double-acting hull” and is fitted with an azimuthing pod for propulsion.
The Azipod concept, as it is called, allows the ship to move sternfirst efficiently in the ice; the ship is designed to break 1.5 meter thick ice unassisted. In light ice or open water, Norilsk Nickel turns 180 degrees and moves bow first. Ice trials for the new ship were conducted in March 2006 in the Kara Sea and Yenisei River, and the vessel achieved a 3-knot speed continuously moving through 1.5 meter thick ice.
Norilsk Nickel has performed well in operating unassisted (without icebreaker escort or convoy) during its initial two years of service. With four more of the class being built in Germany, MMC Norilsk Nickel will have an operational fleet of five icebreaking carriers, all highly capable of operating independently through the winter season to serve the port of Dudinka. Safe and efficient, the Norilsk Nickel class ships represent a new concept of Arctic marine operations. They will enhance a regional, Arctic marine transport system in western Siberia and better link a key Russian commercial enterprise to world markets.
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The Selendang Ayu Disaster in the Alaska Arctic |
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 On November 28, 2004, after loading 1,000 of fuel and 60,200 of soybeans, the Selendang Ayu departed Seattle, Washington,with a crew of 26 along the North Pacific Great Circle Route bound forXiamen, China. Ten days later the 225-meter Malaysian-registered bulkcarrier broke apart off the rugged coast of the Aleutian Islands of Alaskaresulting in the deaths of six crew members, causing the crash of a U.S.Coast Guard helicopter and spilling an estimated 66 million metric tonsof soybeans, 1.7 million liters of intermediate fuel oil, 55,564 liters ofmarine diesel and other contaminants into the environment furthercausing the deaths of seabirds and marine mammals (See page 151).
A U.S. National Transportation Safety Board marine accident brief isthe basis for this report. Despite passing inspection by port authoritiesand U.S. Coast Guard officials prior to leaving Seattle, the seven-yearold Panamax class vessel encountered engine problems approximately100 nautical miles from Dutch Harbor, the closest place of refuge, andabout 46 nautical miles from the nearest point of land. After leavingport in Seattle, the ship had encountered heavy seas and between galeand strong gale force winds.
On his second transit of the Bering Sea, the vessel’s master, a citizenof India and a 32-year seagoing veteran, notified the harbormasterin Dutch Harbor via the vessel’s satellite phone he was having difficultiesand needed assistance. The Coast Guard immediately dispatchedthe cutter Alex Haley but because of the rough seas could only reacha top speed of 10 knots. Nearly six hours later, the cutter reached theSelendang Ayu and attempted to slow its drift toward the coastline byattaching a tow line to the vessel until the tugboat Sidney Foss arrived,which was then approximately 11 nautical miles away.
In the meantime, the wind and sea conditions continued to deteriorate.Arriving on scene, the tugboat master reported seeing theSelendang Ayu lying beam to the sea in 7.6-meter seas, hammered by45- to 55-knot winds. Some crew members were desperately strugglingto remain on the bow as the freighter rolled 25 to 35 degreeswith waves crashing over the deck amid passing snow and ice squalls.The remainder of the crew, some who had been up for some 41 hours,worked frantically to restart the engines.
On the scene, the Sidney Foss was able to slow the drift but unableto turn the stricken ship’s bow into the wind as the vessel drifted closerto the shore. A second tug, the James Dunlap, arrived from Dutch Harborwith sunrise 5 ½ hours away, noted the NTSB report. “Because of the seastate and the darkness, the masters of the Sidney Foss and the JamesDunlap decided to wait until daylight before attempting to swing thebow of the Selendang Ayu around by putting a line on the stern.”
Then, some three hours before sunrise, the towline parted andthe stricken vessel continued its now unabated drift toward UnalaskaIsland. At sunrise, with the Selendang Ayu picking up speed toward thecoastline, the ship’s master dropped anchor in hopes to slow or evenstop the drift. It almost worked.
The port anchor immediately caught, slowing and almost stoppingthe vessel’s drift. The feeling of relief was short-lived as some 15minutes later the ship began slipping its anchor under the unrelentingpounding of the growing storm and started to drift at 2 knots towardshore. The weather continued to worsen with steep seas of 6 to 7.6meters and periodic wind gusts of up to 65 knots, which occasionallypushed the waves to 9 to 10 meters. The Coast Guard suggested droppingthe starboard anchor, “but the Selendang Ayu master said the starboardanchor might foul on the port anchor’s chain,” the report stated.
Several attempts to reestablish a towline failed and with now fadinglight and its proximity to shore, the Coast Guard recommendedevacuating the crew. The master finally allowed a group of 18, thosehe considered the least essential for dealing with the emergency, todepart. Wearing lifejackets, but not the reddish-orange buoyant survivalor immersion suit that protects against heat loss and ingressof water, they would be extracted in two groups. (At the time of theaccident, the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, SOLAS,required a cargo vessel to carry at least three immersion suits for eachlifeboat, unless the vessel had a totally enclosed lifeboat on each side.The Selendang Ayu carried two fully enclosed lifeboats, one port andone starboard and was equipped with three immersion suits. In anamendment effective July 1, 2006 the SOLAS regulation was changedto require one immersion suit for each person onboard a cargo ship. Anexemption from this requirement for ships that voyage “constantly” inwarm climates is not allowed for bulk carriers.)
Using a USCG HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter that had arrived fromCold Bay, Alaska, the first group of nine Selendang Ayu crew memberswere hoisted from the rolling deck. Then only a mile from shore, theship’s port anchor was dropped. It caught. Shortly thereafter, a secondJayhawk helicopter hoisted the second group of nine sailors from theship. Eight crew members remained on board and continued to workfrantically on the engines. As darkness began to close in, the CoastGuard radioed the master and said they wanted to remove the remainderof the crew before sunset. Then came the first of several shuddersas the vessel ran aground on a small underwater shelf about 130meters offshore. Knowing the ship’s fate, the master radioed the AlexHaley and requested immediate extraction.
The eight remaining crew members gathered on the port bow,where the two previous evacuations had taken place. The vesselwas rolling badly in the shallow water and increasing groundswell.Another HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter was dispatched from DutchHarbor to the scene and a short time later the Alex Haley launched thesmaller HH-65 Dolphin helicopter. Both aircraft reached the freighteraround 6 pm with the larger Jayhawk helicopter performing the rescue.Fifteen minutes later all of the ship’s crew, save the master andthe USCG rescue swimmer, had been hoisted onboard when a hugerogue wave struck the bow of the freighter, sprayed up and engulfedthe Jayhawk. The helicopter’s engines stalled, spun around causingits tail and mail rotor blades to slam into the side of the crippled shipand crashed into the sea next to the Selendang Ayu’s forward port side.The Dolphin helicopter, which had been hovering close by, immediatelywent into rescue mode and quickly recovered the three-memberflight crew and the one Selendang Ayu crew member who survived theThe Selendang Ayu Disaster in the Alaska Arctic88 ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT | Current Marine Use and the AMSA Shipping Databasecrash. With no other sign of survivors, the helicopter headed to DutchHarbor. While the master and the Coast Guard swimmer were awaitingrescue, the ship broke in two on the rocks. After three hours of beingbombarded by crashing waves, howling winds in total darkness, theship’s master and the USCG rescue swimmer were hoisted on board theDolphin, which had returned from its trip to Dutch Harbor. It was 10:35pm on December 8, nearly 60 hours since the Selendang Ayu enginesfailed.
Map 5.8 Accident location in Bering Sea. Inset shows route of Selendang Ayuthrough Unimak Pass, approximate point at which engine failed, path of vessel’sdrift without power, and site on Unalaska Island where it grounded.Source: National Transportation Safety Board
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- Several forms of floating ice may be encountered at sea. The most extensive is that which results from the freezing of the sea surface, namely sea ice; but mariners must also be concerned with “ice of land origin” - icebergs, ice islands, bergy bits and growlers. Both icebergs and sea ice can be dangerous to shipping and always have an effect on navigation.
- Young ice: newly formed sea ice less than 30 centimeters thick. It forms extensively in the autumn as ocean surface temperatures fall below freezing and on leads that open in mid-winter due to shifts in the pack ice. It is not a significant safety hazard for most Arctic vessels although, when placed under pressure by winds or currents, it can impede progress.
- First-year ice: can easily attain a thickness of 1 meter but rarely grows beyond 2 meters by the end of the winter. It is relatively soft due to inclusions of brine cells and air pockets and will not generally hole an ice-strengthened ship operated with due caution. Under pressure from winds or currents, first-year ice can impede progress to the point where even powerful vessels can become beset for hours or even days. The Nature of Ice at Sea © Canadian Coast Guard
- Old ice: If first-year ice survives the summer melt season, it is then classified as old ice (subdivided into second-year and multi-year ice). It is typically 1 to 5 meters thick and is extremely hard. During the summer melt process, the brine cells and air pockets that characterize first-year ice drain out the bottom of the ice, leaving a clear, solid ice mass that is harder than concrete. Even ice-strengthened vessels are at risk of being holed by old ice. When under pressure, old ice can stop the most powerful icebreakers.
- Icebergs: are large masses of floating ice originating from glaciers. They are very hard and can cause considerable damage to a ship in a collision. Ice islands are vast tabular icebergs originating from floating ice shelves. Smaller pieces of icebergs are called bergy bits and growlers and are especially dangerous to ships because they are extremely difficult to detect.
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 The Arctic Council Ministers in November 2004 in Reykjavik asked PAME to “conduct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent Participants as relevant.”
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment: PAME PAME is an example of the international cooperation that is a hallmark of the Arctic Council: while the PAME Secretariat is based in Akureyri, Iceland, its chairmanship in the spring of 2009 held by Canada.
Increased economic activity and significant changes due to climatic processes are resulting in increased use, opportunities and threats to the Arctic marine and coastal environments. These predicted changes require more integrated approaches to address both existing and emerging challenges of the Arctic marine and coastal environments.
PAME’s mandate is to address policy and non-emergency pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine environment from both land and sea-based activities, including coordinated action programs and guidelines complementing existing legal arrangements.
According to the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, PAME aims to improve knowledge and respond to emerging knowledge of the Arctic Marine Environment. The AMSA is the primary action item for this objective. The plan also calls on PAME to determine the adequacy of applicable international/regional commitments and promote their implementation and compliance; and facilitate partnerships, program and technical cooperation and support communication, reporting and outreach both within and outside the Arctic Council.
At the 2004 Arctic Council ministers meeting in Iceland, the Reykjavik Declaration asked the PAME work group “to conduct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent Participants as relevant.”
The Origin of the AMSA Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response: EPPR The EPPR Secretariat rotates with the chairmanship of the Arctic Council and as such is located in the spring of 2009 at the Norwegian Coastal Administration, Department for Emergency Response, Norway.
Harsh conditions and lack of infrastructure in much of the Arctic create a higher vulnerability to emergencies than in more temperate climates. Consequently, prevention, preparedness and response must be adapted to Arctic conditions. Accordingly, international cooperation in this area is of major importance.
The mandate of the EPPR working group is to deal with the prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic. Members of the working group exchange information on best practices and conduct projects (for example, development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, training, etc.). EPPR is not a response agency. In 2004, EPPR was directed by the Arctic Ministers to expand its mandate to include natural disasters.
Ongoing EPPR projects address oil pollution spill response in the face of increased Arctic shipping and development; technological support of radiological and other hazard assessments; and natural disaster response, particularly catastrophic river flooding.
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 The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 formally established the Arctic Council as a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the express involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, especially issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
The Arctic Council is comprised of Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America.
In addition to the member states, the council created the category of Permanent Participants in order to provide for the active participation of, and full consultations with, Arctic indigenous representatives within the council. Open equally to Arctic organizations of indigenous people with a majority of Arctic indigenous constituency, the Permanent Participants represent a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state. The following organizations are Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Saami Council and Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North.
Working groups of the Arctic Council execute the programs and projects mandated by the Arctic Council ministers. Each working group, with its supporting scientific and technical expert groups, holds meetings at regular intervals throughout the year, ahead of the meetings of Senior Arctic Officials and Arctic Council Ministers. The six working groups include: Arctic Contaminants Action Program; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Sustainable Development Working Group
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